Showing posts with label arturo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label arturo. Show all posts

Saturday, April 2, 2011

The Regend and the Ninja: A Response (part II)

New readers, please check out the basics before leaving any comments.


On Saturday, Tom Liston of Raptors Republic - TrueHoop's Raptors' affiliate - wrote a column about Reggie Evans and James Johnson. In his column, Tom mentions that he has some problems with Wins Produced and my analysis of Evans and Johnson in the past. Specifically, Tom's main issues seem to be:
  • Evans' WP48 is near the top of the league (currently at 0.356), but Reggie doesn't seem to belong with the other players (Kevin Love, Dwight Howard, Chris Paul, LeBron James, Dwayne Wade) at the top.
  • If Wins Produced doesn't overvalue rebounds, and the only thing Evans' does well is rebound, why is Evans' WP48 so high?
  • James Johnson is playing well in Toronto - "he’s pretty much exactly the same player" as he was during his rookie season. So why did I say that he probably wouldn't be a good player when Toronto traded for him?
  • Wins Produced is one measure of player productivity among several, and one should "never rely on one metric to draw conclusions".

The other day I responded to these first two points. Today I'm going to tackle the last two.

Sunday, March 13, 2011

WOW Network Podcast for 03/13/11

New readers, please check out the basics before leaving any comments.


On Friday - along with David Berri of the Wages of Wins Journal, Arturo Galletti of Arturo's Silly Little Stats, and Mosi Platt of the Miami Heat Index - I participated in a WOW network podcast, which you can listen to here. We talked about "Small Market Teams" and "Super Teams", the NBA draft, and the NFL labour (yes, that word is spelt with a 'u') issue.

Dave also has a short little summary of the podcast on his site.

Saturday, March 5, 2011

The 50 greatest NBA players of all-time

New readers, please check out the basics before leaving any comments.


Given the team's record right now, Raptor news is a bit boring these days; eventually I will take another look at how the individual players have been playing, but Nerd Numbers is down (and the Game Splits tool - which I had just started to rely on for my weekly player evaluations - has been down for a while now). So today I will write about a topic that is barely even tangentially related to the Raptors - my version of the NBA's 50 greatest players.

Sunday, February 20, 2011

WOW Network Podcast for 02/18/11

New readers, please check out the basics before leaving any comments.


This Friday, along with David Berri of the Wages of Wins Journal, Mosi Platt of the Miami Heat Index, and Arturo Galletti of Arturo's Silly Little Stats, I participated in a WOW podcast. If you are interested in listening, the link is here. Dave also has a short little blurb about the podcast - and some relevant links - on one of his recent posts.

Now you can finally put a voice to the words that appear on this website!

 - Devin

(P.S.: If you'd like to complain about my performance - maybe you don't like the way my voice sounds, thought my comments were silly, or just plain don't like me - please do so here)

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Week 14 Team Opponent Stats

New readers, please read the basics before leaving any comments.


Yesterday I posted the Team Stats update for week 14, and the day before that I posted the player stats for week 14. Today I'd like to post something I haven't done before: opponent stats. I figure that it would be interesting (and useful) to see how well other teams perform against the Raptors. Here's another of those weird double-scrolling charts:


Monday, November 22, 2010

Arturo's 100 Worst Seasons/Players in the NBA since 1978

New readers, please check out the basics before leaving any comments.


Arturo has done a lot of number-crunching on historical productivity in the NBA, and yesterday, he posted two lists: the 100 worst seasons since 1978 and the 100 worst players since 1978.

Can you guess where this is going?

Just click the link. If you are looking for more information from the Raptors' perspective, you can take a look at my front-office audit or the ultimate Bargs post.

 - Devin

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

AGS for Front Offices Audit: Toronto Raptors Part 3

For you new readers out there, make sure you know about the basics before you leave a silly anonymous comment.



Continuing with the third part of the front office audit series (please see part 1 and part 2), I'll examine the last three components and offer some suggestions on how to turn the franchise around.


5) If you are going to the free agent market then look for low-priced underrated players.

Colangelo has actually done a pretty good job on this one historically. The Raptors have signed Jose Calderon (Rob Babcock's work, actually), Anthony Parker, Jorge Garbojosa, and Linas Kleiza (all at cheap salaries) from Europe. David Berri, founder of the Wages of Wins Network and creator of the Wins Produced metric, called it Colangelo's "third way" (in addition to drafting and NBA free agents/trades). He also found the undrafted, cheap, and very productive Jamario Moon. He recently re-signed Amir Johnson to a reasonable contract. But at the same time, Colangelo has also signed Hedo Turkoglu to a terrible free agent deal, given Bargnani a ridiculously huge (and long) extension,  traded for the Player Formerly Known as Jermaine O'Neal, and actually gave Jason Kapono a positive amount of money in his contract (rather than asking Kapono to pay him to stay on the team, which is what he'd have done if this was a rational world). So he's done very well on the "small" deals, but very poorly on the "big" deals. In this case, the good outweighs the bad, but the bad has been so bad that I can only give him partial marks on this one.


6) For the playoffs it is more important to have stars than average players. If given the opportunity trade for stars even if it means losing a few slightly above average players.

Playoffs? You're talking about playoffs?!?!? [that's the first and probably the only time I will reference North American Football on this blog] Well, in terms of stars, the Raptors haven't had much luck. Damon Stoudemire and Vince Carter asked to be traded. Tracy McGrady, Shawn Marion, and Chris Bosh left as free agents. Good players like Jerome Williams and Marcus Camby were stupidly traded away. Older but good players like Hakeem Olajuwon, Charles Oakley, and Mark Jackson faded and were either traded away or decided to retire. The Raptors have failed in this area completely.


7) Target good big men (Power Forwards – Centers) and ball handlers (Point Guards).

The Raptors have targeted big men in draft after draft - but other than Bosh, their decisions have been terribly poor. They have had good point guards fall into their hands, only to watch them struggle with injuries (Alvin Williams, Calderon) or suffer from age-related decline (Mark Jackson). In one instance, Colangelo actually traded a big (Charlie Villanueva) for a small (T.J. Ford), something that is a "no-no" according to traditional basketball wisdom; given that Ford was productive and Villanueva was not, it was actually a good move. I'm going to give them an A for effort, but an F for their execution.


Summary:
Five failures and two partial marks out of seven


Verdict:
Do not pass go, do not collect $200.



Future Direction?


Let me start by stating the obvious: hire a GM who knows what they're doing (allow me to suggest a Mr. Galletti). That means that the Raptors should not renew Colangelo's contract once it expires at the end of this season (or fire him sometime during the season), even though they are probably going to ignore that advice.

The next step is figuring out which contracts the Raptors should keep on the books. Most of the players on the team are signed to relatively cheap contracts, but Calderon, Bargnani, and Barbosa have the biggest deals. Bargnani needs to be traded. Barbosa is overvalued and it shouldn't be hard to trade him to a contender or pseudo-contender. Calderon is the interesting case. His history suggests that he is a good player, but he has been declining, his recent play has been poor, and his contract is pretty hefty. I'd keep him for one more season and see how he fares; if he does poorly, he'd be gone before the start of next season. In each of these cases, I would only make trades that would net me at least one (hopefully more) of the following: young players on rookie contracts, players with expiring deals, stars/superstar players (determined by Wins Produced), and draft picks.

The next issue is the Bosh trade exception: it needs to be used. If I had to include it in a package with one of the above players, I would. But preferably I'd used it to acquire a superstar player. I'd go after every star/superstar that I could get (your Wades, Lebrons, Howards, Durants, Rondos and Pauls) but most of those players aren't on the market, so I'd target up-and-coming stars like Westbrook, Noah, Batum, Love, and the like. I'd also look at non-star players if I couldn't do any better.

Once that was done, I'd have a cheap, young, and better team. I'd make sure to continue to flip scorers for draft picks and to use WS40 to determine which players I should draft (or I could just ask Mr. Galletti). The only time I would trade away draft picks is if I could obtain a superstar calibre player in return.

Of the cheaper players on the roster, I'd trade away DeRozan after this season if he maintains his current trajectory. I'd try to include Marcus Banks in deals, but if I couldn't find a use for him I'd be fine with letting his contract come off the books. I'd resign Reggie Evans and Joey Dorsey to really cheap contracts as long as they produce like they have in the past, but I'd avoid long-term deals. Julian Wright and Sonny Weems are quite replaceable, so I'd probably shop around for better players on the free agent market, or use the "third way" and find hidden gems in Europe.

I guarantee that this plan would have better success than whatever Colangelo is doing right now. Such a plan would likely net a playoff berth in the next two seasons, followed by advancing to the second round in the following two years after that. And if the Raptors hired either Arturo, myself, or any of the other Wages of Wins Network analysts, I doubt that they would regret it.

 - Devin

Arturo keeps us honest

For you new readers out there, make sure you know about the basics before you leave a silly anonymous comment. 


Arturo Galletti - polymath and genius extraordinaire - has been keeping track of how accurate the predictions of the Wages of Wins Network Smackdown participants are, as well as those of some other, more prominent analysts (such as a certain ESPN stats "guru").

Go take a look! Right now, I'm in fourth place!

Do I get a medal yet? Or maybe a job with ESPN?


 - Devin

Sunday, October 31, 2010

AG Standards for Front Offices Audit: Toronto Raptors (Draft History II)

This article uses the Wins Produced metric to discuss the productivity of NBA players. This metric is based on box score statistics that are adjusted for other factors including pace, position and team. A general scale is given for these, and links to advanced explanations are listed at the bottom of the page.

Wins Produced per 48 Minutes (WP48) – The number of wins a player produces in 48 minutes of play. 0.100 is average and 0.250 is considered the “superstar threshold”. A player a WP48 of 0.000 produces no wins, and any player with a negative WP48 produces a negative number a wins (or, if you prefer, a positive number of losses)

For more information on the terms used in this post, please consult the Glossary of Terms.




Last time we looked at the last ten years of Toronto's draft history. The general conclusion? The Raptors are really bad at drafting productive players (or, if you want to put an optimistic spin on it, the Raptors are excellent at drafting unproductive players). But, as bad as they were, maybe some of those draft choices were the best available options? Let's take an individual look at each draft pick and see if the Raptors could have gotten anything better than they did (you might want to follow along with this spreadsheet).


  • 2000: #21 Morris Peterson; #56 DeeAndre Hulett 

As a Raptor fan, I gotta love the man. But looking at the numbers, Mo Pete wasn't so good in his first four seasons; he only managed a WP48 of 0.050. At the 21st pick, you would expect there to be some more palatable options than that, but was that the case? While there were 7 players with higher WP48s selected after him, the only truly useful players available were Michael Redd and Eduardo Najera. Overall, Mo Pete wasn't too bad of a pick.

DeeAndre Hulett never played a minute in the NBA, and neither did most of the players selected after him. While Jason Hart eventually played 5289 NBA minutes, he didn't play enough in his first four years to qualify. I'd give the Raptors a pass on this pick.


  • 2001: #17 Michael Bradley; #46 (traded) 

Michael Bradley was actually a pretty good player in limited minutes. Despite that, he never made much of an impact on the NBA, and after the Raptors cut him in 2004, his NBA career was pretty much over. Instead of Bradley, the Raps could've had Mehmet Okur, Jamaal Tinsley, or Samuel Dalembert. The Raptors didn't do too badly with Bradley - now if only they had had the intelligence to play him more minutes.

The 46th pick was traded. Which was fine, because that year there were no useful players available at that number. So far the Raptors have been pretty good.


  • 2002: #20 (traded); #27 Chris Jefferies; #42 (traded) 

And so begins the trading of useful draft picks. Kareem Rush was not a productive player - and Chris Jefferies didn't last long enough for us to find out how good he was. Trading down from #20 to #27, the Raptors missed out on the opportunity to draft Tayshaun Prince. Useful players available at #27 included Carlos Boozer, Dan Gadzuric, Luis Scola, and Matt Barnes. Given that the other two players involved in the exchange of these draft picks were Lindsey Hunter and Tracy Murray, I have no choice but to fail this draft decision. Drafting Carlos Boozer or Luis Scola would've been much better than Jefferies.

At #42, Scola and Barnes were still on the board. Yes, the Raptors could've picked up Boozer and Scola in the same draft if they knew what they were doing. And that is why you don't trade away your second round picks: when you hit with them, they have the potential to turn your franchise around.


  • 2003: #4 Chris Bosh; #52 Remon Van der Hare 

Chris Bosh was a very good fourth pick - accordingly, Arturo ranks him 144 out of 980 draftees. But there were three players available who were even better than Bosh: Wade, Josh Howard, and Luke Walton. Now, keeping in mind that this ranking only considers the first four years, the only player I would think about drafting instead of Bosh would be (of course) Wade. So the Raptors did very well on this one.

Van der Hare never played in the NBA - and no one else drafted after him was useful. Looks like 2003 was a good drafting year.


  • 2004: #8 Rafael Araujo; #39 (traded); #47 Pape Sow 

Ah, the first monumental Raptor bust of the 21st century! Araujo was such a bad pick that he only managed to last 1585 career minutes. In those minutes, he was very bad (WP48 lower than -0.07). Who could the Raptors have chosen instead? Oh, only Andris Biedrins, Andre Iguodala, Al Jefferson, Kevin Martin, Anderson Varejao, Trevor Ariza, Dorell Wright, Josh Smith, Delonte West, Chris Duhon, Tony Allen, and Jameer Nelson - all above-average (WP48 greater than 0.100) players. It's funny, because the recent development of Bargnani had almost made me forget about Hoffa.

The 39th pick could have been useful - Trevor Ariza and Bernard Robinson were both available. Robinson wasn't all that good, but Ariza certainly was.

Ah, good old Pape. Well, he didn't play enough minutes to get ranked, and he wasn't that productive...but there was nothing after him. Hmmm. Maybe Toronto should have just taken Ariza at the 39th instead of trading down...but they only missed one really decent player, so you can't hold it against them too much. Overall though, 2004 was a bad year.


  • 2005: #7 Charlie Villanueva; #11 (traded); #16 Joey Graham; #38 (traded); #41 Roko Ukic; #58 Uros Slokar 

Busy draft year for the Raptors - let's start with the pick that had so many "experts" laughing: Villanueva. He actually wasn't that bad of a player - he managed a WP48 of 0.072 - and, as a scorer, was overrated, but the biggest problem with picking Villanueva so low was that...there were so many better players available. How many? Only David Lee, Marcin Gortat, Amir Johnson, Andrew Bynum, Luther Head, Danny Granger, Travis Diener, Jason Maxiell, Monta Ellis, Jarrett Jack, Ersan Ilyasova, and Ronny Turiaf. The Raptors could've at least chosen Granger there instead. This pick gets a D.

With Graham, you were never sure if you were getting "good Joey", the player who rebounded well and attacked the basket for easy shots, or "bad Joey", the player who hoisted up silly jumpers and didn't do much else (maybe the twins were playing tricks on us all?). Over his first four years his WP48 was 0.056. Again, instead of Graham, the Raptors could've had David Lee, Marcin Gortat, Amir Johnson, Luther Head, Danny Granger, Travis Diener, Jason Maxiell, Monta Ellis, Jarrett Jack, Ersan Ilyasova, or Ronny Turiaf. This pick gets a D minus.

Instead of seldomly played Roko Ukic, the Raptors could have had Gortat or Amir Johnson. But Ukic is exactly the kind of pick you want to make in the second round: high risk, high reward. All things considered, not a terrible choice.

Uros Slokar: another high risk, high reward pick. This time it didn't pan out, but again, at least Toronto went for it. There were no useful players selected after Slokar either, so this was an okay pick.


  • 2006: #1 Andrea Bargnani; #20 (traded); #35 P.J. Tucker; #56 Edin Bavcic 

Everyone should know by now how badly the Raptors did by choosing Bargnani; I've talked about it several times before. In fact, if you've read those posts you'll know that Bargnani is ranked 970/980 draftees on Arturo's list. Instead of Bargnani, the Raptors could have chosen: Rajon Rondo, Renaldo Balkman, Brandon Roy, Paul Millsap, Ronnie Brewer, Leon Powe, Josh Boone, Kyle Lowry, Thabo Sefolosha, Tyrus Thomas, or Shelden Williams. This pick is an F.

Had the Raptors not traded #20, they could've had Rondo, Balkman, Millsap, Powe, Boone, or Lowry. Instead, the 20th pick was used to sweeten up the Jalen Rose trade, which was simply a correction of a previous mistake...and the resulting cap room led to future mistakes. Dumb.

P.J. Tucker didn't get much of a chance to play in the NBA, but when he did play, he showed promise. And after he left for overseas, he actually managed to achieve some measure of success. So the Raptors took exactly the kind of player they were supposed to, only to cut the guy in favour of Luke Jackson.

As Arturo would say

Edin Bavcic didn't play - and there was nobody useful picked after him - but again, at least the Raptors were looking for hidden gems


  • 2007: #22 (traded); #52 (traded) 

Ah, the year of no picks. Why no picks? Because - years before Colangelo - they needed to get rid of Yogi Stewart and wanted to acquire Lamond Murray and John Wallace. Who could they have picked at #22? Rudy Fernandez, Carl Landry, Marc Gasol, Ramon Sessions, and Jared Dudley. At #52, they still could have had Sessions. Lesson? Don't trade away your picks.


  • 2008: #17 (traded); #41 Nathan Jawai; #45 (traded) 

Really? T.J. Ford, Rasho Nesterovic, and the 17th pick for Jermaine O'Neal? The only saving grace of the trade was the cap room that it created, and BC did not use it wisely. The returns are still pretty early, but at #17, the Raptors could have had Luc Mbah a Moute, Serge Ibaka, DeAndre Jordan, Bill Walker, J.J. Hickson, Mario Chalmers, Courtney Lee, Goran Dragic, Ryan Anderson, and Sonny Weems. I'd take any of those players over Jermaine O'Neal, and I'd have been happy to keep T.J. Ford for a bit longer, thank you very much.

Instead of Jawai, Toronto could have had Walker or Dragic. Not too bad, and Jawai was an okay gamble. Those same two players were still available at #45 as well.


  • 2009: #9 DeMar DeRozan; #39 (traded); #51 (traded) 

Another lottery pick, another poor choice. DeRozan didn't have good numbers coming out of college, and his first year wasn't very good (nor was his preseason this year). DeRozan is shaping up to be your classic Raptors lottery pick bust. Who could the Raptors have had instead? DeJuan Blair, Ty Lawson, Jon Brockman, Chase Budinger, Rodrigue Beaubois, Jonas Jerebko, Austin Daye, Jeff Pendergraph, Taj Gibson, Omri Casspi, or Darren Collison - just to name the above average players. It'll be a few more years before we can fully evaluate this draft class, but it's looking very likely that the Raptors made another poor choice.

Picks #39 and #51 were traded. Remember what I said about trading draft picks? Imagine Jerebko, Budinger, Marcus Thornton, or A.J. Price on the team. At least the Raptors got Carlos Delfino out of it...er, I mean, Amir Johnson (not bad, actually, although I would've preferred to have kept Delfino).

  • 2010: #13 Ed Davis; #42 (traded), #50 Solomon Alabi 

Ed Davis seems like he's going to be a very good NBA player, and eventually we will get to see him in action. Based on nothing other than college numbers, it looks as if the Raptors made good pick. Although it must be said that the fact that there were 12 teams drafting ahead of them was probably a big factor in them choosing Davis.

In dropping down from #42 to #50, the Raptors may have missed out on a man with a sexy name, Devin Ebanks, and a man with a humourously erroneous name, Tiny Gallon. I'm not so sure that Alabi was a high risk/high reward player...high risk, certainly, but given that he played in the NCAA and didn't post good numbers, it's not likely that he will turn out to be too productive.


Draft Verdict?

In the last ten years, the Raptors have hit on a draft pick only once (maybe twice if Ed Davis turns out be as good as we think). That is a terrible, putrid rate. Some of the middling picks (late teens to early 30s) were okay, but the Raptors ended up cutting/trading away the draftee too early. Some of their second round picks were at least adventurous, but none of them succeeded. Any time the Raptors get into the lottery, there is a very good chance that they will select someone who not is very productive. To make matters even worse, Toronto has also traded away a rather large number of picks and hasn't made many trades to acquire any back - except for the occasional forced trade, such as the trades involving Carter and Bosh. So really...you can't blame good players for avoiding Toronto.

Next week I'll post Week 1 team stats (as reader Mattt points out, the Raptors are at 0.500 at the moment!), as well as the final part of this AGS front office audit and suggestions for turning the franchise around.

 - Devin

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

AGS for Front Offices Audit: Toronto Raptors (Part 1:Draft history)

This article uses the Wins Produced metric to discuss the productivity of NBA players. This metric is based on box score statistics that are adjusted for other factors including pace, position and team. A general scale is given for these, and links to advanced explanations are listed at the bottom of the page.

Wins Produced per 48 Minutes (WP48) – The number of wins a player produces in 48 minutes of play. 0.100 is average and 0.250 is considered the “superstar threshold”. A player a WP48 of 0.000 produces no wins, and any player with a negative WP48 produces a negative number a wins (or, if you prefer, a positive number of losses)


For more information on the terms used in this post, please consult the Glossary of Terms.
 

As promised, let's take a look at the Raptors' management plan. To start, I have been analyzing the organizational philosophy of the Raptors, and after hours of work, I have come up with an image that summarizes my findings:

Hey - I never said I was an artist
There are certainly more than a few obstacles for the Raptors to overcome in order for them to simply win a playoff series, let alone a championship. So, using Arturo's standards for evaluating front offices - previously employed by Andres to evaluate the Nuggets front office - let's see what the Raptors are doing well and where they can improve.


1) Get an advanced stats model to gain an edge over other teams. Make sure this model correlates with winning.

Raptors GM Bryan Colangelo seems to be skeptical about stats, and, as far as I am aware, does not have any dedicated statistical analysts working for the team. While he claims to have read parts of The Wages of Wins, he clearly doesn't buy into Wins Produced or he wouldn't have made a lot of the moves has has (Bargnani, Turkoglu, etc). So that's a fail.


2) Bolster your roster with draft picks rather than free agency.
3) Flip scorers for draft picks (see 2).
4) Use later picks on high risk/reward players for a cheaper price.

Let's take a look at what happened to all the draft picks the Raptors have had since 2000. Although Colangelo has only been around since 2006, I think we should also look at how the Raptors did BBC (before Bryan Colangelo), so let's look at the last 10 years of Raptors drafting:

That list doesn't look too good - but we are not done yet. We also have to consider that some of those picks were immediately traded to other teams:
  • Kareem Rush, along with Tracy Murray, and a 2003 draft pick (Luke Walton), to the Lakers for Lindsey Hunter, Chris Jeffries, and a 2003 draft pick (Ramon Van de Hare)
  • Roy Hibbert, along with T.J. Ford, Rasho Nesterovic, and Maceo Baston, to Indiana for Jermaine O'Neal and Nathan Jawai
  • Acquired Pape Sow and a 2005 draft pick (Uros Slokar) from the Miami Heat for a 2004 draft pick (Albert Miralles)

And what about the draft picks that Toronto traded away:
  1. 2001 draft pick (Ousmane Cisse), along with Kevin Willis, Alex Radojevic, and Garth Joseph, to the Nuggets for Keon Clark, Tracy Murray, and Mamadou N'Diaye
  2. 2002 draft pick (Jason Jennings), along with Charles Oakley, to the Bulls for Brian Skinner
  3. 2005 draft pick (Fran Vasquez), along with Corliss Williamson, Tyrone Corbin, and Kornel David, to the Kings for Jerome Williams and Eric Montross
  4. 2005 draft pick (Travis Diener), along with Mengke Bateer and Remon Van der Hare, to the Magic for Robert Archibald and a 2005 draft pick (Roko Ukic)
  5. 2006 draft pick (Renaldo Balkman), along with Jalen Rose, to the Knicks for Antonio Davis
  6. 2007 draft pick (Jared Dudley), along with Michael Stewart, to the Cavs for Lamond Murray and a 2004 draft pick (Albert Miralles)
  7. 2007 draft pick (Taurean Green) to Portland for John Wallace
  8. 2008 draft pick (Goran Dragic) to the Spurs for the rights to Giorgos Printezis
  9. 2009 draft pick (Jack McClinton), along with Matt Bonner and Eric Williams, to the Spurs for Rasho Nesterovic
  10. 2009 draft pick (Jonas Jerebko) to the Pistons for Carlos Delfino
  11. 2010 draft pick (Da'Sean Butler) to the Heat due to the Shawn Marion trade
  12. 2011 second round draft pick to the Pistons for Carlos Delfino
  13. 2013 second round draft pick to the Mavs (to acquire Slomon Alabi)
  14. 2014 second round draft pick to the Celtics (to acquire Patrick O'Bryant)
  15. 2015 second round draft pick to the Rockets (to acquire David Andersen)
  16. 2016 second round draft pick to the Grizzlies (to acquire Turkoglu)

    And what about future draft picks they've acquired:
    1. 2011 first round draft pick from Miami (Chris Bosh trade)
    2. 2015 second round draft pick (51-55 only) from the Clippers for Hassan Adams

      Phew! That was a lot of work. By the way, these last two lists may not be complete - it turns out that it's actually quite difficult to find out what happened to all the draft picks that the Raptors have acquired or traded away over the years (my best resource was, unsurprisingly, Wikipedia). Adding everything above together, how successful has Toronto been with its picks? To evaluate drafted players, we'll turn to Arturo's handy Draft Score spreadsheet, which ranks the past 30 years of draft picks. Since the total number of players drafted is 980, each draftee can be expressed as a percentage (1-n/980). Please note: Arturo's draft numbers are based only on the first four years of a player's career (their rookie contract) and includes only those players who managed to play at least 1600 minutes over four years (400 minutes a year). Numbers for players drafted after 2006 are calculated using Andres Alvarez's Automated Wins Produced.

      If you'd rather view this spreadsheet as a webpage, click here.



      Given that list, what can we say about the Raptors' recent draft history? Abysmal. Of the 15 retained draftees that could have played four seasons by now, only six were even ranked (ie: nine players didn't even manage to play 400 minutes/season in their first four seasons). The six rankable players - including Chris Bosh - had an average ranking of 517/980 (48%). Take out Bosh (144), and the remaining five players had an average rank of 585/980 (40%). The Raptors simply do not draft well.

      Toronto has been the team trading the draft picks in order to get...mostly unproductive bench players. The Raptors fail #2 and #3 big time. Up until 2006 (the first year with Colangelo at the helm), the Raptors were doing okay on #4, but since then, they haven't had any second round picks to use, because they traded them away (not entirely Colangelo's fault, as many of the transactions happened years ago). But because they demonstrated that they have no understanding of the value of second round draft picks, I'm giving them a fail there too.


      This post is getting far too long, so I'm going to split it into at least two parts. In the next part, I want to review individual draftees and then see how the Raptors measure up to the last three aspects of Arturo's requirements.


       - Devin
       


      Wednesday, October 20, 2010

      Arturo's preseason WP for all players

      This article uses the Wins Produced metric to discuss the productivity of NBA players. This metric is based on box score statistics that are adjusted for other factors including pace, position and team. A general scale is given for these, and links to advanced explanations are listed at the bottom of the page.

      Wins Produced per 48 Minutes (WP48) – The number of wins a player produces in 48 minutes of play. 0.100 is average and 0.250 is considered the “superstar threshold”. A player a WP48 of 0.000 produces no wins, and any player with a negative WP48 produces a negative number a wins (or, if you prefer, a positive number of losses)



      I've been posting preseason EWP - that's Estimated Wins Produced - numbers for Raptors players in my Preseason Reviews, but today Arturo Galletti posted WP - the real Wins Produced - numbers for every player in the league as of 10/19!

      Please note that there are differences between the numbers I've posted and Arturo's numbers - there are two reasons for this. One, EWP is exactly what it claims to be: an estimate. EWP uses Win Score to estimate WP numbers. And two, Arturo uses simple positions in his calculations. That means that players who play multiple positions are assigned to one position only, which makes the calculations slightly inaccurate. But Arturo didn't have the time to adjust hundreds of players' positions! So both numbers - his and mine - are slightly off. But his are certainly more accurate for players who have only played one position all preseason long.

      I'd like to point out a few observations from Arturo's league-wide WP numbers:
      • Blake Griffin is destroying the league - making it even more obvious that Bargnani is a bust
      • Kleiza (9th), Jack (11th), and Johnson (24th) are in the top 25 for players who have played at least 60 minutes
      • Dorsey (6th) and Wright (13th) are in the top 15 for players who haven't played at least 60 minutes
      • Bargnani is 12th among players who have played at least 60 minutes....12th last, that is. Hey, at least he's better than unproductive ex-Raptor Jason Kapono.

      Go check out the list, and while you're there, take a look at all the other stuff Arturo has on his great site.


       - Devin



      Thursday, October 14, 2010

      Is Bargnani a bust?

      This article uses the Wins Produced metric to discuss the productivity of NBA players. This metric is based on box score statistics that are adjusted for other factors including pace, position and team. A general scale is given for these, and links to advanced explanations are listed at the bottom of the page.

      Wins Produced per 48 Minutes (WP48) – The number of wins a player produces in 48 minutes of play. 0.100 is average and 0.250 is considered the “superstar threshold”. A player a WP48 of 0.000 produces no wins, and any player with a negative WP48 produces a negative number a wins (or, if you prefer, a positive number of losses)

      Over on TrueHoop today, Zach Harper writes that we shouldn't call Andrea Bargnani a bust just yet:
      In the last 10 drafts, Oden, Andrea Bargnani and Kwame Brown are probably the only players considered a bust. While Oden’s injury issues and Kwame’s issues with being able to play NBA basketball at a high level are the reasons for their bust label, trying to determine why Bargnani is a bust might be as simple as figuring out if he’s even been playing the correct position.

      The reason I bring this up is because of the reputation Bargs has garnered in his short career. Is he simply a case of Kwame Brown, in which he’s just not good enough? Or is he more like an Andrew Bogut-type of first pick that was playing out of position early on and needed the right fit to start to blossom? 

      And additionally, Zach Lowe of The Point Forward, after talking at length about how poorly Bargnani has played thus far in his career, writes:
      Still, through four seasons, Bargnani has proved to have a single valuable skill: an ability to score from the perimeter, both off the catch and off the dribble. That’s a great and unique thing for a 7-footer to be able to do, but it will not be enough anymore. The Raptors need more from Bargnani, and it’s unclear if he can give it to them.

      I have already taken a look at Bargnani's production before, but sure, let's go ahead and revisit this issue.


      "Bargnani is not a bust"

      A first overall pick is expected to not only be a good player, but a great player, and, hopefully, better than any other player in that year's draft. Although NBA teams don't always get it right, the productivity of first overall picks is much higher than the productivity of any other pick. Arturo Galletti has done a lot of work on the productivity of draft picks, and he determined that the average WP48 of the first pick (for the years 1977-2006) is 0.169. The next most valuable pick is the third pick (yes, ahead of the second) at a WP48 of 0.133. The best player in the draft usually has a WP48 around 0.278, and the 20th best player usually has a WP48 of around 0.048. With that in mind, who were the last 12 first overall picks in the NBA draft (12 because John Wall and Blake Griffin have yet to play in a regular season game), and how productive have they been over the course of their careers?



      Hmm. So Bargnani doesn't really compare very well to those players, or to what we should come to expect from a first overall pick? Who would've known. Bargnani and Bogut are not even remotely comparable (Bogut has almost 34 wins on him). In his first four years, he actually managed to produce a number of losses even greater than the number of wins that Kwame (who is popularly - and deservedly - regarded as a bust) produced in his first four seasons. You think that's bad? It gets even worse for Bargnani when you consider that:
      • Bogut, Howard, and James all improved significantly in the years following their 4th season
      • Rose and Oden improved on their rookie years during their second seasons
      • Blake Griffin is on the cusp of what appears to be an excellent rookie season
      • Without playing a single game, Griffin and Wall have been more productive than him
      Maybe it was a weak draft year? Well yes, 2006 was a weak draft class (thanks again to Arturo), but there were still plenty of productive players available in that draft.

      Nope, I think I'm going to have to pull a Bill Walton again: Andrea Bargnani was a terrrrrrible first overall pick. In fact, the expectation to be productive magnifies his lack of production, and so Arturo ranks him the tenth worst pick - at any draft position - of the last 30 years.

      Let me let reiterate: the choice to select Bargnani as the first overall pick was worse than every other draft decision made in the last 30 years, with the exception of the drafting of the following players:
      Not exactly elite company, is it? I think it's safe to say that - by any stretch of the imagination - Bargnani's been a bust of colossal proportions.


      "Bargnani has a single valuable skill"

      Basketball is about scoring more points than the other team, something I've written about before (and you should probably read that if you haven't already). In order to win, you have to be good at both scoring and preventing your opponent from scoring. Andrea is not good at preventing others from scoring; he doesn't rebound well, pass the ball well, or steal well, and is around average when it comes to getting blocks. He doesn't turn the ball over. His defense is below average; he's improved over the years and isn't as bad as he used to be, but no one is going to mistake him for Dwight Howard. The one advantage Bargnani has over other bigs is his shooting, as he is above average with regards to Adj.FG%, FT%, FG attempts, and points scored.

      The problem is that Bargnani's "unique and valuable skill" of perimeter shooting...isn't all that valuable. If you want to score points, there are two areas on the court you should be shooting from: 1) the immediate basket area and 2) the three-point line. All those deep twos and midrange shots? Inefficient. That's because the farther you get from the basket, the harder is is to make your shots, and the lower your percentages get. The reason why three-point shots are useful is because of the extra point. If you are shooting from somewhere other than the immediate basket area, it should be from the three-point line.

      How have Bargnani's shot attempts changed over the years?



      As you can see, shot attempts increased everywhere on the court, except for 3pt shots. The shots that increased the most were <10ft and 16-23ft shots (also of note: his percentages for shots other than threes and layups were abnormally high. I expect that, while part of the increase may be due to true improvement, most of it was due to random luck). He takes deep twos at almost the same rate that he takes threes; if you are going to be taking long-range shots, why not take a few steps back and go for the extra point? So, while Bargnani is a good shooter, he'd be even better if he started taking more threes and driving to the basket more often, and cut back on the other types of shots as much as possible.

      And I think that's the reason why deep-shooting big men are so rare: big men are the tallest players on the court, and as such, are able to park themselves right next to the basket and score a bunch of easy points. A big man who doesn't do this is wasting his key talent - being tall. The big guys on your team must be able to rebound and get easy points next to the basket and Andrea doesn't do either of those things. Until he learns how to do those things, he will forever be an inefficient, unproductive player.

       - Devin

      Tuesday, October 12, 2010

      NBA GMs: Making the best decisions given limited information

      Andres over at Nerdnumbers has his weekly podcast up - go check it out.
      Done yet (and don't say no)? Good.

      In the podcast, Arturo comes right out and says that NBA GMs are stupid. Then Andres reminds him that if he wants to do stat work in the NBA, he should be more friendly to GMs, and so Arturo amends his statement: "NBA GMs make the best decisions given their limited information." What led to this discussion? The annual NBA GM Survey. My favourite one - when it comes to the Raptors, because there's a lot of crazy stuff in there - is the following prediction:

      Which team will be most improved in 2010-11?
      1. Miami - 39.3%
      2. New York - 14.3%
      3. Washington - 14.3%
      4. Clippers - 10.7%
      5. New Jersey - 10.7%
      6. Philadelphia - 7.1%
      7. Toronto - 3.6%

      That means that at least one out of the 30 NBA GMs (and the percentage actually works out to 1/28, so two GMs didn't vote, or something weird happened) thinks that the Raptors are going to improve on last year's 40-42 record to such a degree that they improve more than any team in the league. Now, at the start of the summer (before free agency) things looked much more optimistic than they do now; when Matt Barnes was going to sign with the team, things looked a lot better; before Ed Davis injured himself playing pickup ball in Mississauga, things looked better. But right now, things don't look good for the Raptors. And you, Mr. Anonymous NBA GM, are telling me that not only are the Raptors going improve on last year's record, but that the Raptors will actually improve more than any other team in the league? More than Miami? How did you get your job again?

      Previously, my prediction for the Raptors was around 35 wins, but I was being optimistic and it was done using a rather simplistic method. Pretty soon I will post my more complicated win predictions for all teams, predict all the award winners, and take a pre-season stab at who will win the Championship. But for right now, I will leave you with the following number:

      28

      (Gold star if you can guess its significance)

       - Devin.